COMMENTS
BORN IN THE U.S.A., BUT NOT NATURAL BORN: HOW
CONGRESSIONAL TERRITORIAL POLICY BARS NATIVE-BORN
PUERTO RICANS FROM THE PRESIDENCY
*

John R. Hein

“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
1
States.”
One of the “best aspects of the American political tradition” is the
notion that every American child—regardless of race, creed, gender,
2
or social status—can grow up to become President. On first glance,
the language of Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the United States
Constitution enshrines this notion into the highest law of the land—
the only permanent discriminatory bar to the American presidency is
3
that candidates be “natural born” citizens. Incorporation of the
Twelfth Amendment places the same limitation on eligibility for the
4
vice-presidency.
5
But the meaning of this “natural born” proviso long has been the
subject of controversy because it is not defined anywhere in the Con6
stitution. The Supreme Court has ruled without doubt that United
States citizens born to parents who are subject to United States juris-
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J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2009; B.A., Harvard College, 2006.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
See Randall Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 175, 175–176 (1995)
(arguing for the importance of the formal proposition that every native-born American
child could conceivably grow up to become President).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. The age and residency requirements can be viewed as temporary bars in that anyone who has reached the age of thirty-five and has resided in the
United States for at least fourteen years becomes eligible for the presidency.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874) (“The Constitution does not,
in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.”).
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diction in one of the fifty states are unquestionably natural born citi7
zens and therefore eligible for the presidency and vice-presidency.
But immigrants who become United States citizens through a naturalization process are not eligible for either office because the Supreme Court has ruled that these citizens clearly do not qualify as
8
natural born under Article II. Critics of the clause have described it
9
as “opaque” for its ambiguity of language and “an instance of rank
10
superstition” for its role in distinguishing between the rights of citizens based on their place of birth. Some have gone so far as to
11
charge that the Natural Born Clause is “un-American.” This latter
charge is most often leveled by critics advocating that foreign-born
12
citizens should also be eligible for the office of the presidency.
The impact of the Natural Born Clause does not stop at foreignborn naturalized citizens, however. The language of Article II casts a
shadow of doubt over the status of Native Americans who are mem13
bers of tribes recognized by the United States government, children

7

8

9
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13

See Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why
We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 90–91 (2005). See also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328
(1939) (holding that a person born in New York City did not lose citizenship by virtue of
moving to Sweden and becoming a Swedish citizen); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82,
85 (1934) (holding that a person born abroad is a United States citizen if his or her father was a citizen and the father was at some time a resident of the United States); United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898) (noting Congress’s authority to confer
citizenship on children born abroad to United States citizens).
See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (“[T]he rights of citizenship of the native
born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive. The only
difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the ‘natural born’ citizen is eligible to be
President.”); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913) (“[A] naturalized citizen stands
on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the
Presidency.”).
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 55 (2005) (“While the language of this portion of
Article II may appear clear on its face, few constitutional provisions are actually so
opaque.”).
See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 176 (describing the natural born requirement as nothing
but “idolatry of mere place of birth”).
Akhil Reed Amar, Natural Born Killjoy, LEGAL AFF., Apr./Mar. 2004, at 16. See also Kennedy, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that the natural-born citizen requirement presumes
that some citizens are “a bit more American” than other citizens); Robert Post, What Is the
Constitution’s Worst Provision?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 193 (1995) (criticizing the validity of birthplace as a “proxy for allegiance”).
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 136–37 (reasoning that the natural born distinction
is based on faulty presumptions); Kennedy, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that all citizens
should be eligible to seek the nation’s highest office).
See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that a member of an Indian tribe recognized by the United States was not a citizen of the United States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment because he was not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
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14

born to U.S. citizens living abroad, and those born in U.S. embassies, on military bases, and in other areas within the jurisdiction of
15
the United States. From this last group emerges the interesting case
of citizens born in United States territories, such as Puerto Rico.
Such citizens clearly are not foreign born, but are these citizens natural born for purposes of Article II and, in turn, eligible to run for the
presidency?
The answers to these questions have an obvious impact on the
pool of potential presidential candidates in future elections, though
the issue has arisen in the past. Barry Goldwater, the Republican
senator and presidential candidate in the 1964 election, was born in
the Arizona territory in 1909—three years prior to Arizona state16
hood. His eligibility for the presidency, however, was never ques17
tioned at the time, so the issue was neither raised nor resolved.
Four years later, the eligibility of another Republican presidential
candidate—George Romney, the Governor of Michigan—was challenged on the grounds that he was born to American missionaries in
18
Chihuahua, Mexico. Romney withdrew before the race was over,
though, and the status of a citizen born of American citizens abroad
19
John McCain, United States Senator
also remained unresolved.
from Arizona and the Republican nominee in the 2008 presidential

14
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States). But see Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)) (conferring citizenship upon all Native Americans so long
as they were born inside the territorial limits of the United States).
See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 670 (1927) (“[A]t common law the children of our
citizens born abroad were always natural born citizens from the standpoint of this Government . . . .”). But see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702–03 (1898) (“A
person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by
authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens,
or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial
tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.”).
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 102–03 (discussing the eligibility of children born in
these areas of United States jurisdiction).
THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, at 211–12 (1965) (detailing
Goldwater’s birth in the Arizona Territory in 1909).
See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD.
L. REV. 1, 28 n.219 (1968) (noting the dismissal of a state court suit challenging Goldwater’s candidacy on the grounds that he was not a natural born citizen).
See Warren Weaver, Romney’s Foes, or Friends, Expected to File Court Test of His Citizenship, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1967, at 28 (detailing the challenge to Governor George Romney’s bid for
the Republican nomination in 1968).
Gordon, supra note 17, at 28.
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election, was born in the Panama Canal Zone in 1936. Scholars
have argued that his presidential eligibility is protected first by the
21
common law principle of jus soli—Latin for “right of the soil” —
because the Canal Zone was, at the time of his birth, a United States
possession, and second by the principle of jus sanguinis—Latin for
22
“right of blood” —because his parents were both United States citi23
zens at the time of his birth. Residents of Puerto Rico—a United
24
States territory with Commonwealth status —are made citizens at
25
birth by statute. Are these citizens more akin to naturalized immigrants, Native Americans, Barry Goldwater, John McCain, or natural
born citizens native to one of the states?
This Comment examines the Natural Born Citizen Clause in Article II of the United States Constitution as it relates to the narrow case
of citizens native-born to United States territories, particularly Puerto
Rico. Puerto Rico receives special attention for several reasons: the
unique history by which it became a United States territory; the continued interest its citizens have in determining the political status of
26
the island ; Congress’s inability—or unwillingness—to resolve that
status; and the fact that of all the territories under U.S. jurisdiction,
27
Puerto Rico is the most likely to be considered for statehood. These
factors collectively make the case of Puerto Rico one of particular sa20
21
22
23

24

25
26

27

See JAMES W. JOHNSON, ARIZONA POLITICIANS: THE NOBLE AND THE NOTORIOUS 10 (2002)
(stating that John McCain was born in the Panama Canal Zone).
See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (7th ed. 1996) (defining jus soli as the right or law of the soil).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus sanguinis as “[t]he rule that a
child’s citizenship is determined by the parent’s citizenship”).
See James C. Ho, Unnatural Born Citizens and Acting Presidents, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 575,
579 (2000) (arguing that although McCain was born in the Canal Zone, he is a natural
born citizen under the common law).
See, e.g., Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that Puerto Rico—like the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Guam—
is not a “state” within the meaning of the Constitution. Its status has altered over the period since it became a territory of the United States, culminating in an agreement in
1952, approved by the citizens of Puerto Rico, that Puerto Rico should have a unique
“Commonwealth” status; but the unique status is not statehood within the meaning of the
Constitution).
See Act of June 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-477, 48 Stat. 1245 (extending United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans born on or after April 11, 1899).
See DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO’S FUTURE: A TIME TO DECIDE 6 (2007) (noting that
plebiscites for Puerto Ricans to determine the status of the island have been held in 1967,
1993, and 1998).
See id. at 5–6 (noting that Puerto Rico is the largest, most populous, and most economically significant of all the remaining territories of the United States; four million people
of Puerto Rican birth or descent live within the mainland United States; and Puerto Rico
has a continued strategic importance to the United States’ presence in Latin America).
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lience in resolving the constitutionality of native-born citizens in
United States territories seeking the presidency and the practical implications of these results.
From the outset, it is worth noting that the current political and
legal status of Puerto Rico and its citizens is one of continued contro28
versy, subject to impassioned viewpoints. For the purpose of fully
analyzing the question of natural-born citizenship in relation to native-born Puerto Ricans, this Comment accepts the current status of
and law governing the island and its citizens without opining on what
is best for Puerto Rico.
Part I provides a historical and legal overview of the natural born
citizen proviso of Article II. This section distinguishes the meaning
of natural born citizens from that of “naturalized” citizens in order to
fully extract the subtle but important difference between the two
phrases.
Part II examines the territorial incorporation and naturalization
powers exclusive to Congress and the manner in which Congress and
the Courts have recognized the citizenship of persons whose status is
not immediately apparent. This section demonstrates that Congress,
through these powers, holds the authority to decide the political
status of territories and, in turn, the citizenship status and presidential eligibility of the citizens of these territories.
Part III analyzes the legal and political status of Puerto Rico and
citizens native-born to the U.S. territories. After comparing the Congressional treatment of Puerto Rico as a territory and the way in
which Congress conferred citizenship to Puerto Ricans, this section
concludes that native-born citizens of Puerto Rico—as well as those
native-born of other United States territories—are ineligible for the
presidency.
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of these conclusions,
arguing that any other finding would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the underlying problem—the unincorporated status of Puerto
Rico.

28

See Johnny Smith, Note, Commonwealth Status: A Good Deal for Puerto Rico?, 10 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 263, 271 (2007) (describing how the three major political parties of
Puerto Rico reflect the three major viewpoints on political status for the island—the
Puerto Rican Independence Party favors independence, the New Progressive Party favors
statehood, and the Popular Democratic Party supports some form of the current commonwealth status).
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I. DISTINGUISHING NATURAL BORN FROM NATURALIZED
A. The Historical Origins of the Natural Born Citizen Proviso
29

Several commentators have suggested that the natural born citizen requirement for presidential eligibility originates from a July 25,
1787 letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and possibly to
other delegates at the Constitutional Convention, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of
our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in
Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but
30
a natural born Citizen.

Jay’s letter was likely prompted by suspicion of ambitious foreigners who served in the Revolutionary cause, or a response to Conven31
tion discussions of a monarchy headed by a foreign ruler. Regardless of his motives, his letter predated the appearance of the phrase
“natural born citizen” in the Committee of Eleven report by six
32
weeks, and is therefore thought to be the source of the phrase in the
33
Constitution. Ultimately, the “natural born citizen” language was

29

30
31

32

33

See Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789: A Study in Constitutional
History, in 40 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
415, 551 (1922) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional provisions
relating to the Presidency). See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 5 & n.27 (supporting the
Thach hypothesis that John Jay’s letter to George Washington is the most likely source of
the “natural born citizen” language in the Constitution).
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 237 (1905)).
See Thach, supra note 29, at 551 (“[T]here can be little doubt that it was [von Steuben] . . . with his sympathies for the followers of Shay, and his evidently suspected dealings with Prince Henry of Prussia, whom Jay had in mind when he penned these words.”);
id. at 551 (suggesting distrust of Baron von Steuben, who had served in the Revolutionary
forces but whom Jay distrusted); Cyril C. Means, Jr., Is Presidency Barred to Americans Born
Abroad?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 23, 1955, at 28 (quoting Pa. Journal, Aug. 22,
1787) (stating that to quell popular fears that the Convention was considering foreigners
for the presidency, the delegates released an official statement to the Philadelphia press
stating: “We are informed that many letters have been written to the members of the
Federal Convention . . . respecting the reports idly circulating that it is intended to establish a monarchical government, to send for [Prince Frederick Augustus], &c. &c.—to
which it has been uniformly answered, ‘though we cannot, affirmatively, tell you what we
are doing, we can, negatively, tell you what we are not doing—we never once thought of a
king.’”).
Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for
Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 888 (1988) (“The letter is
generally assumed to be the source of the phrase in the Constitution.”).
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 4–5 (detailing the sequence of events leading up to the inclusion of the natural born proviso in the presidential eligibility clause of the Constitu-
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introduced by the Committee of Eleven and adopted by the Conven34
tion without debate.
At least one other commentator has noted that Jay’s letter and the
adoption of the natural born language might very well have been
prompted by a document written by Alexander Hamilton on June 18,
35
1787—about a month prior to Jay’s letter. “Hamilton submitted a
‘sketch of a plan of government which ‘was meant only to give a more
correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he
36
should probably propose . . . in . . . future discussion.’’ Article IX,
section 1 of that sketch provided [an early version of the presidential
eligibility clause]: “‘No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the
37
States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States.’” Similar
to Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution, Hamilton’s
sketch for presidential eligibility provides that those who were currently citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution would not be excluded from the presidency. But unlike
the Constitution’s requirement, Hamilton’s sketch requires only that
the President be born a citizen; there is no natural born requirement.
Thus, according to Hamilton’s sketch, the President need not be na38
tive born, but must be a citizen from birth. That the Constitution
bypassed such language in favor of Jay’s suggests that the natural
39
born language had a very specific meaning to the Framers, just as
did the other presidential requirements—that candidates be at least
40
thirty-five years old and U.S. residents for fourteen years.

34

35

36
37
38
39
40

tion); Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen
Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 349, 352–53 (2001) (tracing the source of the Natural Born Citizen Clause back to John Jay’s letter to George Washington).
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 4 (citing JONATHAN ELLIOT, 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 289 (2d ed.
1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]); Lohman, supra note 33, at 352–53 (describing
the Committee of Eleven’s adoption of the language).
See Pryor, supra note 32, at 888–89 (concluding that the speculations of Jay’s motives are
buttressed by the earlier Hamilton document containing different language which would
have had a different impact on presidential eligibility).
Id. at 889 (quoting 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 617 (rev. ed. 1937)).
Id. (quoting 3 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 629).
See Pryor, supra note 32, at 889 (analyzing the presidential requirements in Article IX,
section 1 of Hamilton’s submitted sketch).
See Lohman, supra note 33, at 353 (arguing that the natural born language meant something very specific to the Framers).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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B. The Meaning of “Natural Born”
Traditional inquiries into the meaning of the natural born proviso
search for the Framers’ original intent of the term “natural born” at
41
the time of the adoption of the Constitution. As other commentators have noted, there are several problems with the traditional ap42
proach. The presidential qualification clause in Article II, section 1,
clause 5 marks the only appearance of the phrase “natural born” in
43
the Constitution, and nowhere does the Constitution define the
44
phrase. Furthermore, no explanation of the meaning or intent of
the natural born proviso appears anywhere in the recorded delibera45
tions of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
In the absence of direct evidence from the Convention, the tradi46
tional approach looks next to the guidance of English common law.
47
in which the colonial legal system was grounded. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the natural born citizen
clause, the Court has analyzed the evolution of the common law re41

42

43

44
45

46

47

See Pryor, supra note 32, at 882 (“Constitutional scholars have traditionally approached
the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the natural-born citizen clause by inquiring
into the specific meaning of the term ‘natural born’ at the time of the Constitutional
Convention.”).
See id. at 883 (“The traditional approach has not established the clause’s full and precise
meaning, however, because it fails to adequately consider a critical analytical question
that must inform our understanding of the constitutional text: What is the proper role
for Congress in giving specific content to the natural-born citizen clause?”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (incorporating this language into the Constitution by disqualifying for the Vice Presidency any person “constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President”).
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874) (“The Constitution does not,
in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.”).
Gordon, supra note 17, at 3–4 (noting that the Convention wrote on a clean slate following the Articles of Confederation, which did not provide for a Chief Executive). See also 1
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 143, 280 (detailing the deliberations of the members of the Committee
on Detail, the five-man committee—Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson—to which the Convention referred various resolutions, including the establishment
of a national executive); Pryor, supra note 32, at 885–86 (providing a summation of the
relevant records of the Constitutional Convention).
See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, (1888) (“There is, however, one clear exception
to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are
framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its
history.”).
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 5 (exploring the British antecedents of the law of citizenship
and presidential eligibility from monarchy to republic); Pryor, supra note 32, at 886–88
(detailing the guiding principles of nationality law in England). See also United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (“In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly
known to the framers of the Constitution.”).
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garding citizenship in America in the case of United States v. Wong Kim
Ark:
The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, uses the
words ‘citizen of the United States,’ and ‘natural-born citizen of the
United States.’ . . .
The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by
the affirmative declaration that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States.’ In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the
light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. The language of the
Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without ref48
erence to the common law.
49

The basic tenet of jus soli long guided nationality law in England.
Under this principle, anyone born on British soil, with few excep50
tions, was a “natural-born British subject.” British civil law, however,
gradually adopted the principle of jus sanguinis, which granted natural born citizenship by descent or inheritance, not solely by birth51
right. This inherited English tradition became more complex when
the American colonies passed their own naturalization laws prior to
52
the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. There was no
uniform rule of naturalization prior to the Naturalization Act of
53
1790. This has led some to the conclusion that, at the time of the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, there was no discernable com54
mon understanding of the definition of “natural born citizen.” This
is too broad an overstatement, however, because what remains clear,
whether the Framers’ understanding of “natural born citizen” followed solely the principle of jus soli or also incorporated jus sanguinis
at the time of Convention, is that “natural born citizen” at least meant
48
49
50
51

52
53
54

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 654 (citations omitted).
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 6 (explaining how jus soli emerged out of feudal concepts of
allegiance).
See Pryor, supra note 32, at 886 & n.24 (describing the meaning of jus soli).
See id. (describing the complications of tracing the adoption of English nationality law in
the colonies because colonists inherited primarily, but not exclusively, English common
law (jus soli) and not civil law (jus sanguinis)).
See id. at 887 & n.33 (describing the lack of uniformity among the naturalization laws of
the various colonies).
Id. at 887. Prior to Congress’s first exercise of the naturalization power (the Naturalization Act of 1790), there were no uniform rules of naturalization.
See, e.g., id. at 887–88 & n.35 (maintaining that while there is no evidence that there was
an agreed-upon meaning of “natural born citizen” at the time of the Constitutional Convention, nothing in the British or early American traditions suggests that there were different meanings for the terms “naturalized,” “natural-born,” and “citizen at birth”).
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jus soli—any native born citizen was a natural born citizen of the
United States, with the traditional exceptions of children of diplo55
mats (whose allegiance remained to their respective countries). It is
also clear what “natural born citizen” did not mean: a naturalized
citizen. As Chancellor James Kent wrote in his Commentaries, the
concern is one of allegiance:
Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the
United States. This is the rule of the common law, without any regard or
reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with
the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are, in theory, born
56
within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent.

The Supreme Court has expressed a similar sentiment: “To create
allegiance by birth, the party must be born, not only within the terri57
tory, but within the ligeance of the government.”
If “natural born” incorporates the principle of jus sanguinis,
someone like Senator John McCain is clearly a natural born citizen,
because regardless of whether or not his birthplace counts as part of
the United States and grants him natural born status through jus soli,
he clearly inherits his natural born status by virtue of both of his parents having been natural born citizens. The same would not hold
true for the vast majority of native-born Puerto Ricans, because their
natural born status necessarily turns on whether or not birth in
Puerto Rico grants them the right through jus soli. This is so because
if Puerto Rico does not grant these citizens natural born status via
right of the soil, the only alternative is through right of inheritance.
But, assuming their parents are native-born Puerto Ricans (and not
citizens born on the mainland United States), their parents would
not be natural born citizens by virtue of birthplace any more than are
their children. Thus, whether or not the Framers understood “natural born” as incorporating jus soli solely or in conjunction with jus
sanguinis does not clear the ambiguity regarding the presidential eligibility of native-born Puerto Ricans.
C. The Meaning of Naturalized and Naturalized at Birth
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part: “All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-

55
56
57

See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 662 (1898) (discussing the
meaning of natural born citizenship in light of the common law).
Id. at 664 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 38–39 (6th ed.
1848)).
Id. (quoting 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 42).
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tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
58
wherein they reside.”
The Supreme Court has interpreted this
clause to mean that there are only two means of acquiring citizen59
ship: birth and naturalization. The Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 defined “naturalization” as “the conferring of nationality
60
of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.”
Thus, naturalized citizens are neither native born nor natural-born.
The Court has made clear that, under the Constitution, “a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all
61
respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency.”
What remains less clear is how to interpret the status of a statutory
citizen naturalized at birth—that is, a person who is made a citizen at
birth by statute, not by virtue of the Constitution. The case of nativeborn Puerto Ricans presents this very scenario of “statutory” United
62
States citizens. Answering this question requires an examination of
the territorial incorporation and naturalization powers exclusive to
Congress and the manner in which Congress has recognized the citizenship of Puerto Ricans.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER TERRITORIES AND CITIZENSHIP
A. Congressional Power of Territorial Incorporation
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
63
belonging to the United States . . . .”
Through the Territorial Clause, the Constitution grants Congress
64
the exclusive power to regulate all territories of the United States.
The Continental Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance of

58
59

60
61
62
63
64

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (describing two paths to citizenship: the
native born path and the naturalized citizen path); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702 (“The
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that ‘all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside,’ contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.”).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (1964). A similar definition appeared in the Nationality Act of 1940, § 101(c), ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137.
Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 2 (describing differences between U.S. nationals and
“statutory” U.S. citizens).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See id.

434

[Vol. 11:2

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
65

66

1787 as the territorial policy of the United States. Through this
policy, Congress placed on the path of incorporation territories ac67
quired by the westward expansion of the United States. The North68
west Ordinance assumed territorial status was temporary. The end
goal of the territorial incorporation process was statehood, and between 1796 and 1959, Congress admitted thirty-two incorporated ter69
ritories into the Union as states.
B. Congressional Power of Naturalization and Judicial Interpretation
“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule
70
of Naturalization . . . .”
Through the Naturalization Clause, the Constitution grants Congress the exclusive power to establish a uniform rule of naturaliza71
tion. Pursuant to this power, Congress has passed several statutes
concerning immigration and naturalization, culminating in the Im72
migration and Naturalization Act of 1952. This Act describes the
procedures for immigrating to the United States and becoming a
73
naturalized United States citizen. But the Act does not settle many
of the ambiguities created by the Constitution’s “natural born” language. The following provides a brief overview of the manner in
which Congress and the Courts have recognized the citizenship of
persons whose status and presidential eligibility is not immediately
apparent.

65
66
67
68

69

70
71
72
73

Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 9, 45.
Id.
In reference to the original territory “north-west of the river Ohio” governed by the statute, the Northwest Ordinance pronounced that organization of the area as a territory was
“for the purposes of temporary government.” See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51
n.(a).
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 9 & n.1 at 32. Thornburgh list the territories admitted to statehood under the territorial incorporation policy set down by the Northwest
Ordinance as: Tennessee (1796), Ohio (1803), Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Missouri (1821), Arkansas (1836), Michigan (1837), Florida (1845), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), Minnesota
(1858), Oregon (1859), Kansas (1861), Nevada (1864), Nebraska (1867), Colorado
(1876), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Montana (1889), Washington
(1889), Idaho (1890), Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907), New Mexico
(1912), Arizona (1912), Alaska (1959), and Hawaii (1959).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Id.
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1503 (2006)).
Id.
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1. Persons Born in United States Territories Prior to Statehood
Senator Barry Goldwater, born in the Arizona territory in 1909,
presents the only instance of a presidential candidate born in a
74
United States territory prior to statehood. His candidacy was never
challenged, and his defeat by President Lyndon B. Johnson prevented any claims of a constitutional crisis from arising. John Nance
Garner, presidential candidate in the Democratic primary of 1932
and Vice President for the first two terms of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s tenure in office, was born in Texas several months
75
prior to its re-admittance into the Union in 1868 after the Civil War.
However, there is no record of any legal challenge to his qualifica76
tions for office on natural born grounds. Garner stepped down as
Vice President in January, 1941, ending any further constitutional
77
questions.
But Goldwater and Garner raise the issue of the presidential eligibility of persons born in territories that later become states. The only
possibility of a modern-day Goldwater scenario would be if a citizen
born in Alaska before January 3, 1959, or born in Hawaii before August 21, 1959—i.e., prior to those states’ admittance into the Union—
78
ran for the presidency. From the time of its purchase by the United
States from Russia in 1867, Alaska was considered an incorporated
79
territory. Congress declared Hawaii an incorporated territory after
80
April 30, 1900. An incorporated territory is one which has been incorporated into the body politic of the United States, usually by Con-

74
75
76
77

78

79
80

See WHITE, supra note 16, at 211–12 (noting Goldwater’s birth in the Territory of Arizona
in 1909).
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 91 n.199 (raising the issue of Garner’s presidential
eligibility).
Id.
Because the Twelfth Amendment disqualifies for the Vice-Presidency any person “constitutionally ineligible to the office of President,” the same constitutional issue over whether
or not Garner was a natural born citizen was raised by virtue of Garner’s election to the
Vice Presidency. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
These are the official dates of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii. See Act of Mar. 18, 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4; Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339; Proclamation No. 3309, 24 Fed. Reg. 6868 (Aug. 25, 1959) (admitting Hawaii into the Union);
Proclamation No. 3269, 24 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 6, 1959) (admitting Alaska into the Union).
See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding that Alaska was an
incorporated territory).
See Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (declaring Hawaii an incorporated territory
after this date, and all of its citizens at the time of its acquisition by the United States on
August 12, 1898, to be United States citizens).
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81

gressional action. Because incorporation is a necessary and impor82
tant step in the path to statehood, Congress has been careful to extend incorporation only to those territories “destined for state83
hood.” Because of incorporation’s designation as a stepping stone
for statehood, the Constitution applies in full force to incorporated
84
territories, such as Alaska and Hawaii prior to statehood. Therefore,
commentators have argued that it is likely that persons born in these
territories that are destined for statehood subsequent to being designated as incorporated territories qualify as natural born citizens under Article II, as well as birthright citizens within the meaning of the
85
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, whether a territory is “in the United
States” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment likely
turns on Congressional intent with respect to that territory’s future
86
statehood. This group includes Goldwater, Garner, and the aforementioned citizens of Alaska and Hawaii. Still, in the absence of an
explicit ruling by the Supreme Court, the eligibility of such persons
for the office of the presidency remains uncertain.
2. Persons Born to Americans Abroad
Most of the debate surrounding the natural born proviso has focused on whether foreign-born children of citizen parents fall under
the meaning of “natural born.” This rekindles the discussion of
whether the governing principle of “natural born” is jus soli or jus
sanguinis. If the former meaning applies, then foreign-born children
of natural-born citizen parents do not qualify as natural-born; if the
latter applies, then they do. Congress’s first exercise of its naturaliza81

82
83
84

85
86

See Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 521 (holding that territory is usually incorporated by congressional action, and in the case of acquiring a territory by treaty, the treaty is also important); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding that the Constitution did
not require the right to trial by jury in the Philippines while it was a United States territory); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that “Porto [sic] Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States
within the revenue clauses of the Constitution . . . .”).
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 311 (1922) (“Incorporation has always been a step,
and an important one, leading to statehood.”).
Smith v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 714, 718 (3d Cir. 1967).
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 15, 26 (1995) (“For those territories ‘incorporated’ into the United
States by congressional and executive branch action and deemed to be on the road to
statehood (such as Alaska), the Constitution applied in full.”).
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 92 (arguing for the inclusion of these groups under
the meaning of natural born citizens as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Id. at 92 & n.206 (noting Congress’s plenary power over territories under Section 3 of
Article IV of the Constitution).
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tion powers—the Naturalization Act of 1790—followed the principle
of jus sanguinis, providing that “the children of citizens of the United
States, that may be born beyond sea . . . shall be considered as natural
87
born citizens . . . .” Congress repealed the 1790 Act, however, in
1795 and replaced it with legislation providing substantially the same
provisions with one significant change—it stated that foreign-born
children of citizen parents “shall be considered as citizens of the
88
United States.” Thus, the new legislation omitted the characterization of such children as “natural born.” While there is no evidence
explaining why the 1795 legislators omitted the natural born language, the language has not since reappeared in any legislation con89
cerning citizenship. More recent legislation refers only to citizen90
ship at birth and by naturalization, much like the Court’s
91
interpretation of the two means to citizenship. The Cabinet Committee—comprised of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
92
and the Secretary of Labor —whose five-year study was responsible
for the Nationality Act of 1940 noted that the question of whether the
Constitution’s language of “natural born citizens” includes foreign93
born children of citizens was “still a subject of debate.” But this
Committee recognized the possibility that the Framers may have had
a broader definition of “naturalization” in mind, which would have
included the acquisition of citizenship at birth by foreign-born chil94
dren of citizens. Congress has since passed several statutes govern-

87
88
89

90

91
92

93
94

Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104.
Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415.
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 11 (noting that after removing the language from the Naturalization Act of 1795, Congress has never reinserted the natural born language into its
naturalization laws).
See Immigration and Nationality Acts, supra note 60. See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 11
(asserting that modern designations of citizenship refer only to citizenship by birth and
by naturalization).
See cases cited supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 15 (quoting UNITED STATES COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE
NATIONALITY LAWS, NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES: MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A REPORT PROPOSING A REVISION AND
CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES vii (Comm. Print 1939)
[hereinafter NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES]) (describing the evolution of
citizenship and presidential eligibility in recent legislation, including the 1940 United
States Code).
Id.
Id. at 15 (quoting NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 3) (noting
that while the Committee acknowledged this possibility of a broader meaning of “naturalization,” it also recognized the “now universally” accepted meaning that naturalization
encompassed citizenship after birth).
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95

ing citizenship by birth abroad. As a general rule, the citizenship of
foreign-born persons who claim derivative United States citizenship
through certain familial relationships is governed by the statute in ef96
fect at the time of the person’s birth. Statutes conferring such citi97
zenship are construed prospectively only in application.
3. African American Freedmen
The status of African Americans has been a source of controversy
98
since this nation’s founding. At the time of the Constitution’s adop99
tion, African Americans were citizens of several states. But in the
Dred Scott case, the Supreme Court held that African Americans—
100
even those born free—were not citizens of the United States. The
ruling of this case was short-lived, however, and was overruled by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of this Amendment confirmed
the principle of birthright citizenship and guaranteed the application
of this principle to groups that had been previously excluded by
101
Congress and the Courts, especially the descendants of slaves.
In
this way, the Fourteenth Amendment reaffirmed the principle of jus
soli:

95

96

97
98

99

100
101

See DANIEL LEVY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK § 4:17 (Charles Roth
ed. 2007) (listing in detail several statutes governing citizenship by birth abroad); see also
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(g) (2006) (granting
derivative citizenship to all foreign-born children of an American parent, providing
United States citizenship for children under five found in the United States with unknown parentage, and incorporating predecessor statutes).
See Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting citizenship based
on citizenship statute applicable when petitioner was born in 1967); Alcarez-Garcia v.
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the applicable citizenship law for petitioner born in 1952 was 8 U.S.C. § 601(g) (1940)); Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
2000) (applying the citizenship statute of 1977 for petitioner born in that year).
See, e.g., Wolf v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1957); Palomo v. Mitchell, 361 F. Supp.
455 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1973).
See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 66 (1985) (noting that the status of African Americans
had been a subject of debate in the United States since at least the 1820s).
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 572–75 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting)
(“At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and
North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those
States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise
of electors, on equal terms with other citizens.”).
Id. at 454 (holding that Dred Scott was not a citizen under the meaning of the term as
used in the Constitution).
See Pryor, supra note 32, at 881 n.2 (describing the application of jus soli to descendants of
slaves through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule
of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under
the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself)
of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers . . . or of enemies
within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory . . . . The
Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children
born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of
102
whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.

4. Native Americans
Before 1924, Native Americans could attain citizenship only by
103
The Supreme Court held that
naturalization, treaty, or statute.
tribal Native Americans were not citizens within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment because they were perceived “as owing im104
mediate political allegiance to their ancestral tribes,” and therefore
105
“were not part of the people of the United States.” But a Congressional statute passed in 1924 made all Native Americans born in the
106
This statute has been extended to include
United States citizens.
107
Eskimos, Aleutians, and members of any other “aboriginal tribe.”
Through this statute, Native Americans are treated as are any other
108
The Supreme Court held that
citizens for jurisdictional purposes.

102
103

104

105
106

107
108

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898).
See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that a Native American who had not
been naturalized was not entitled to register to vote in Nebraska because Native Americans do not acquire citizenship at birth even though they are born in the United States);
see also United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916) (holding that Congress alone had
the power to dissolve tribal relations); Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892) (holding that Native Americans in the state of Nebraska became United States citizens by statute); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 330 (1892) (holding that, through a treaty, a Native
American resident of Minnesota became a citizen of the United States).
Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application of
Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 699 (1995) (explaining
why the Fourteenth Amendment had not previously applied to Native Americans).
See Elk, 112 U.S. at 99.
See The Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253
(1924) (“That all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United
States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, That
the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the
right of any Indian to tribal or other property.”).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006) (granting citizenship to “a person born in the United States
to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe”).
See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956) (“Indians are citizens and . . . in ordinary
affairs of life, [are] not governed by treaties or remedial legislation . . . .”); see also Poitra
v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975) (ruling that Native Americans are citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes); Ex parte Green, 123 F.2d
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Native Americans who remain on tribal reservations are citizens of
109
the state in which the reservation is located.
Similarly, the Court
ruled that a Native American who has left the reservation is a citizen
110
of the state in which he or she is domiciled. It remains subject to
debate, however, whether the 1924 statute extending citizenship to
Native Americans confers “natural born” status to them, because the
Supreme Court has never overruled its prior ruling that Native
Americans are not citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
“the United States citizenship of many Native Americans purportedly
arises from collective naturalization by statute rather than the Consti111
tution.”
5. Persons Born in the District of Columbia
The issue of presidential eligibility for citizens born in the District
of Columbia revolves around the question of whether the District
112
would be defined as “in the United States.” Congress, with a Con113
stitutional grant of authority, has never designated the District of
114
Columbia as a state. The District also has never been defined as an
unincorporated territory of the United States, and the Constitution
115
therefore applies in full force to the District. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hether the District of Columbia constitutes a ‘State or Territory’ within the meaning of any particular . . . constitutional provision depends upon the character and aim

109

110
111

112

113
114

115

862, 864 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (holding that Native Americans are citizens for purposes of Selective Service Act).
See Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that where an action
arose out of an accident on an Indian reservation, federal jurisdiction could not be based
on diversity of citizenship when defendant Native Americans were members of tribes located in North Dakota and plaintiff was resident of North Dakota residing outside the
reservation).
Id.
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 102 (citing CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 92.03(3)(e) (2004)) (asserting that the natural born proviso “casts
a shadow over the eligibility of at least some Native Americans to serve as President . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 89–90 (noting
that, at a minimum, citizens born “in the United States” are considered natural born citizens under the principle of birthright citizenship).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
While several attempts at statehood have been advanced, e.g., S. 898, 103d Cong. (1993);
H.R. 51, 103d Cong. (1993), Congress has never admitted the District of Columbia as a
state.
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 97 (describing the status of the District of Columbia
and the presidential eligibility of citizens born in the District).
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116

of the specific provision involved.” The Court has determined that
the District of Columbia is not a state for purposes of the Fourteenth
117
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Congressional representa118
119
tion, or diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Article III. But residents
of the District of Columbia are protected by the Due Process clause of
120
the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether a citizen born in the District of Columbia is a natural
born citizen, prompting some commentators to view the status of
121
such citizens and their eligibility for the presidency as uncertain.
Such a conclusion, however, seems to contradict the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the District’s status. As early as 1820, Chief Justice
John Marshall stated: “The district of Columbia . . . is not less within
122
the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania . . . .” Therefore,
it appears that citizens born in the District are as entitled to natural
born status as those born in Maryland, Pennsylvania, or any other
state in the Union.
6. Persons Born in United States Embassies, Military Bases, and Other
Areas of Special Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has ruled that the territory subject to United
States jurisdiction “includes the land areas under its dominion and
control, the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea
along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the
123
coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles.”
Congress has since extended the territorial waters to twelve nautical

116
117
118

119
120

121
122

123

District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973) (holding that the District of Columbia was not a “State or Territory” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Id. at 424.
Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) (“We conclude from our analysis
of the text that the Constitution does not contemplate that the District may serve as a
state for purposes of the apportionment of congressional representatives.”).
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588 (1949) (holding that the
District of Columbia was neither contemplated as a state nor admitted as a new state).
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding racial segregation in the District of
Columbia’s public schools unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was applied in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 98 (asserting that “a modicum of uncertainty remains” over the presidential eligibility of citizens born in the District of Columbia).
Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319, 325 (1920) (“Congress possesses,
under the constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within the District of Columbia . . . .”).
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923).
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124

miles from the baselines of the United States.
Because territorial
waters are considered an extension of the land, “whether a birth occurs along the coast of Virginia or that of Puerto Rico could be sig125
nificant in determining whether a citizen is natural born.”
While it is generally assumed that anyone born in a United States
embassy, consulate, or other installation (such as a military base) is a
United States citizen at birth, such birth does not result in citizenship
126
unless there is also another basis for citizenship.
Similarly, while
United States civilian and military vessels in international and foreign
waters or airspace are subject to United States jurisdiction for several
purposes, birth aboard these vessels does not in itself guarantee citi127
zenship.
While at least two commentators have argued in favor of
interpreting the status of children born of military personnel living
abroad on active duty assignment as falling under the “natural born”
128
umbrella, even this status remains ambiguous.
III. NATIVE BORN PUERTO RICANS AND PRESIDENTIAL ELIGIBILITY
Congress has defined “United States” in a geographical sense to
mean “the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
129
Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.” However, these
entities are not all accorded the same legal status. Under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate
130
territories “belonging to the United States.”
It is also “well established that Congress possesses plenary power to legislate for territo131
ries acquired by purchase, conquest, treaty, or war.” The Court has
124
125

126
127

128

129
130
131

See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 102 & n.263 (arguing that because the legal principle
of jus soli is based on actual physical presence, children born to aliens in international
zones are arguably natural born United States citizens).
See GORDON ET AL., supra note 111, at § 93.02(2)(d).
See Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928) (holding that a person born to alien
parents while aboard an American ship in foreign waters did not acquire United States
citizenship at birth); see also Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 103 (citing Lam Mow).
See Lohman, supra note 33, at 366 (“Thus, under both the common law and Wong Kim
Ark, it appears that, at the very least, all foreign-born children of United States citizens,
foreign-born as a direct result of parental government employment, are ‘within the allegiance’ of the United States at birth. For example, this should encompass all children of
United States military personnel, whether or not in enemy occupation of a foreign
land.”); cf. Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 103 (endorsing Lohman’s interpretation,
but acknowledging that the presidential eligibility of such children is ambiguous).
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (2006).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 17; see also Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 140 (1904)
(finding “Congress possessing and exercising the absolute and undisputed power of gov-
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interpreted this power as granting Congress the ability to determine
what parts of the Constitution, apart from these fundamental rights,
132
will apply to each unincorporated territory. The inhabitants of unincorporated territories are not United States citizens until Congress
chooses to grant United States citizenship to them, and only Congress
has the power to determine upon what terms the United States will
133
receive these inhabitants and what their status will be.
A. Why Puerto Rico Merits Special Attention Among Unincorporated
Territories
There are several reasons why Puerto Rico ought to be considered
134
a unique case among the unincorporated territories. With a popu135
lation of more than 3.8 million people, Puerto Rico is by far the

132

133

134

135

erning and legislating” for territories (quoting Seré v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337
(1810))).
See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 528 (1905) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment applied to Alaska, an incorporated territory); Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149 (holding
that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the Philippines, an unincorporated territory);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215–18 (1903) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments did not apply to Hawaii until it had been formally incorporated); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 342 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the uniformity
clause of the Constitution was not applicable to Congress in legislating for Puerto Rico).
See Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 429 (1957) (noting that “‘. . . [t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants . . . shall be determined by the Congress’” (quoting
Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754)).
There are five remaining organized, unincorporated territories, all islands: American
Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 11 (discussing U.S. policy toward unincorporated territories). Of these, Congress has designated American Samoa as an “outlying possession[] of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (2006). The citizens of these possessions are not born United States citizens, but acquire noncitizen nationality at birth and
may become citizens through an expedited naturalization process. See Duggin & Collins,
supra note 7, at 96 n.229 (“Residence as a national in American Samoa satisfies the permanent residency requirement for naturalization, and American Samoans can freely enter the United States and become naturalized after three months.”). There are also
eleven small island territories, largely uninhabited, and unorganized: Bajo Nuevo, Navassa Island, and Serranilla Bank in the Caribbean Sea; and Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Atoll, Palmyra Atoll, and Wake
Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 11, 32 n.10. All of these are
also unincorporated territories, except for Palmyra Atoll. In addition to being the only
existing incorporated territory, the Pacific island of Palmyra Atoll is also an unorganized
territory with no indigenous population. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of
Insular Affairs, Definitions of Insular Area Political Organizations, http://www.doi.gov/
oia/Islandpages/political_types.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (defining “incorporated
territory” and “unorganized territory”).
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Data for Puerto Rico, http://www.census.gov/census
2000/states/pr.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
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largest unincorporated territory of the United States—larger than the
populations of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Is136
lands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands combined. Puerto Rico’s population also rivals that of many states; if Puerto Rico ever achieved statehood, it would be the twenty-fifth most populous state in the Union
and would send about half a dozen representatives to the House in
137
addition to two senators. There are also more than 3.4 million persons of Puerto Rican descent living in the continental United States,
138
comprising about 1.2% of the nation’s population.
This reflects
not only the close social, political, and cultural ties between both the
United States proper and the island, but also the fact that the issue’s
salience reaches a constituency beyond Puerto Rico itself.
The ties between Puerto Rico and the United States are further
evidenced by the two countries’ financial and strategic ties. Federal
aid is critical to the health of the Puerto Rican economy. The current
federal subsidy of the Puerto Rican commonwealth is estimated at
139
$16 billion annually and growing. In return, Puerto Rico provides
the United States with an important military and strategic foothold in
140
the Caribbean.
Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. military in all of
141
American’s wars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and
Puerto Rico ranks alongside the top five states in the Union in per
142
capita military service.
Puerto Rico’s historical relationship with the United States presents a unique case unlike that of any other state already admitted
into the Union or any other territory not yet admitted. Over a century ago, the United States Congress agreed to determine the “civil

136

137
138
139
140
141

142

The combined population of American Samoa (population 57,291), Guam (population
154,805), the Northern Mariana Islands (population 69,221), and the U.S. Virgin Islands
(population 108,612) is 389,929. See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Results for the Island Areas, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/islandareas/index.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 15.
U.S. Summary: 2000, Census 2000 Profile 2 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002
pubs/c2kprof00-us.pdf.
THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 6, 7 n.4 (citing other estimates that place the subsidy as
high as $22 billion annually).
Id. at 6 (noting that Puerto Rico was once home to the largest U.S. military base in the
world at Roosevelt Roads, which could be reactivated in the future if needed).
See George H. W. Bush, Foreword to THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at viii (“In particular,
Puerto Ricans have fought bravely in all of America’s wars in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries.”).
THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 6.
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rights and political status” of Puerto Rican residents.
Yet today,
their rights and status are as ambiguous as ever. Ninety years after
Congress conferred U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico,
the island remains the only large and populous U.S. territory that has
never been placed on the path to either statehood or independ144
ence.
Finally, Puerto Rico has generated the bulk of litigation concerning the status of territories and the rights of their citizens, due in
large part to the salience of the issue of Puerto Rico’s status among its
145
citizens.
Therefore, while Puerto Rico serves as a good lens
through which to analyze the legal status and presidential eligibility
of citizens of other territories, it presents an original and fascinating
case study in its own right.
B. Acquisition from Spain
Territorial policy substantially deviated from the Northwest Ordinance policy of incorporation after the Spanish-American War, when
the United States acquired sovereignty or control over Cuba, Guam,
the Philippines, and Puerto Rico under the Treaty of Paris, signed
146
with Spain on December 10, 1898.
Under this treaty, Spanish subjects born and residing in Puerto
Rico had the choice to either remain subjects of the Spanish crown or
147
be granted U.S. nationality. All other Spanish nationals residing in

143

144
145
146

147

See Treaty of Peace, U.S.–Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (“The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress.”).
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 5 (noting that Alaska and Hawaii were the last large
territories admitted into the Union as states).
See Smith, supra note 28, at 271 (noting the high voter turnout—over 70%—in the last
two referenda over Puerto Rico’s status).
THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 10 (stating that federal territorial policies and practices
deviated in earnest following the Spanish-American War); see also Treaty of Peace, supra
note 143, art. I–III (stating that Spain relinquished “claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba,” and “cedes to the United States” Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines).
See Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX (“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula,
residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty . . . . may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a
court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.”).
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Puerto Rico automatically became United States nationals at the time
148
of the treaty’s ratification.
149
Article IX of the treaty, consistent with the Territorial Clause,
stated that the “civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be de150
termined by the Congress.” But unlike the federal treatment of the
territories acquired by westward expansion, including Alaska and
Hawaii, congressional action that followed did not make these terri151
tories part of the United States. As a result, the Citizenship Clause
of the Constitution did not apply to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico or
any of these territories at the time of their acquisition by the United
152
States. Prior to the Treaty of Paris, “[e]very treaty by which territory
was ceded to the United States . . . contained some provision whereby
either all or some of the inhabitants of the ceded territory could, either immediately or ultimately, be admitted to United States citizen153
ship.”
This marked the first time in American history that, “in a
treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no promise
of citizenship . . . . [nor any] promise, actual or implied, of statehood.
The United States thereby acquired not ‘territories’ but possessions
154
or ‘dependencies’ and became, in that sense, an ‘imperial’ power.”
C. Congressional Policy Towards Puerto Rico and Judicial Interpretation
Following the Treaty of Paris, congressional action towards Puerto
Rico has been marked by the passage of a series of “organic” laws,
similar to those passed for other “organized” territories, aimed at
enabling the residents of the island to establish local rule consistent
155
with and subject to federal law.
Congress passed the first of these
organic laws, the Foraker Act, in 1900 in order to establish a tempo-

148

149
150
151

152
153
154
155

See id. See also LEVY, supra note 95, § 2:16 n.4 (citing an Immigration and Naturalization
Services interpretation of the treaty as not allowing these other subjects to retain Spanish
nationality).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX.
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1922) (noting that Downes v. Bidwell had
made settled law the fact “that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was territory which
had been incorporated in the Union or become a part of the United States, as distinguished from merely belonging to it”).
LEVY, supra note 95, at § 2:16.
LUELLA GETTYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 144–45 (1934).
JULIUS W. PRATT, AMERICA’S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT: HOW THE UNITED STATES GAINED,
GOVERNED, AND IN PART GAVE AWAY A COLONIAL EMPIRE 68 (1950).
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 11 (describing the nature of the organic laws).
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156

rary civil government of the island. The Foraker Act established the
office of Puerto Rico’s resident commissioner, a non-voting member
157
of the U.S. House of Representatives with a four-year term. Under
this Act, Congress retained the power to annul any laws enacted by
158
this legislature.
Congress also granted Puerto Rican citizenship to
all former Spanish subjects residing in Puerto Rico since the treaty’s
159
ratification.
A year after passing the Foraker Act, the Supreme Court issued
160
the first in a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases. In these
cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to create
161
unincorporated territories. The Court distinguished these from incorporated territories by holding that the latter are intended for
statehood from the time of acquisition and have the entire Constitu162
tion applied to them in full force.
Unincorporated territories, on
the other hand, were not incorporated in the tradition of the Northwest Ordinance and not intended for statehood, and in these territo-

156
157
158
159
160

161

162

Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (repealed 1917).
See id. § 39 (describing the position of the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico). See also
48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006) (setting the term of the resident commissioner to four years).
Foraker Act, supra note 156, § 31.
Id. § 7. See also LEVY, supra note 95, § 2:16 n.5 (noting that under this Act, Congress extended United States citizenship to former Spanish subjects only).
See Smith, supra note 28, at 268 n.72 (providing the full list of Insular Cases, which include: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182
U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico
S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Rassmussen v.
United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Dowdell
v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); and
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)); but see Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 93
n.212 (noting that some scholars limit the series to the original 1901 cases, while others
extend the canon to include between twenty-three and twenty-eight Supreme Court decisions through 1922, ending with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)); see also José A.
Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 419 n.97 (1979) (limiting the canon of Insular Cases to the first four of its kind in 1901).
See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149 (“We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the
right to acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in Article IV, § 3 . . . does
not require that body to enact for ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by
Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and
that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such right to
territory so situated.”).
See Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 528 (holding that the Constitution applied in full force to
Alaska, an incorporated territory).
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ries only fundamental rights apply by their own force. In Downes v.
Bidwell, the Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico was “a territory appurtenant and belonging to . . . but not a part of the United States
164
within [certain provisions] of the Constitution.”
This departure
from the territorial policy of the Northwest Ordinance was justified,
in part, because the territories acquired from Spain were “inhabited
by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of
taxation and modes of thought” and therefore “the administration of
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may
165
for a time be impossible.”
In Gonzales v. Williams, the Supreme Court ruled that native-born
Puerto Ricans who came to the mainland United States were neither
166
Instead, the Court carved out a new status
aliens nor immigrants.
for these residents “who live in the peace of the dominion of the
167
United States” and left the future of their “civil rights and political
168
169
status” to the discretion of Congress.
Congress increased local authority over the administration of civil
government and, more importantly, conferred statutory citizenship to
170
One of
all citizens in Puerto Rico through the Jones Act of 1917.
the primary motivations for extending citizenship to Puerto Ricans
under the Jones Act was to proclaim “‘the future of Puerto Rico to be
something other than national independence,’ while denying that
171
citizenship entailed an immediate eventual offer of statehood.”
Thus, in granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans, Congress did not intend to expand their rights, nor did it demonstrate congressional in-

163

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

See Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
599 n.30 (1976) (noting that the unincorporated territories “included those Territories
not possessing that anticipation of statehood. As to them, only ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants”).
Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
Id.
Gonzales, 192 U.S. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 9 (citing Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX).
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 49 (stating that through the Gonzales decision, the Supreme Court invented a new class of persons).
Jones Act, Act of March 2, 1917, Ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951. The Jones Act is also known as the
Organic Act of 1917.
Eduardo Guzmán, Note, Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States: The Right of the United States
Citizens of Puerto Rico to Vote for the President and the Need to Re-evaluate America’s Territorial
Policy, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 154 (2001) (citing JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND
THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 6 (1979)).
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tent to incorporate the territory into the United States. Puerto Ricans born on the island after the passage of the Act, however, did not
173
become United States citizens at birth as a result of the Jones Act.
Congress did not extend citizenship at birth to all persons born in
174
Puerto Rico until 1934. Because members of Congress did not believe that residents of Puerto Rico were capable of self-government,
the increases in self-government granted by the Jones Act were coun175
terbalanced by other restrictions.
Like the Foraker Act before it,
the Jones Act “carefully avoided” any language concerning Puerto
176
Rico’s relationship to the United States.
Five years later, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Supreme Court ruled
that the extension of citizenship to Puerto Ricans neither incorporated the territory into the United States nor granted its citizens more
177
rights than were conferred in the Foraker and Jones Acts.
The
Court concluded that the unincorporated status of Puerto Rico
handed down by the Insular Cases was clear by 1917, and the Court
found no congressional action in the Jones Act that would change
178
that fact. The Court stated that “[i]ncorporation has always been a
step, and an important one, leading to statehood” and, therefore, “it
is reasonable to assume that when such a step is taken it will be begun
and taken by Congress deliberately and with a clear declaration of
179
purpose, and not left a matter of mere inference or construction.”
In this way, the Court held that the status and rights of Puerto Ricans—and other U.S. citizens of incorporated territories—had to be
explicitly determined by Congress through its territorial powers and
172
173

174
175

176
177

178

179

Id. at 153–54 (discussing congressional intent in granting citizenship to residents of
Puerto Rico).
See Conrad v. Dulles, 155 F. Supp. 542, 543 (D.P.R. 1957) (noting that the Jones Act did
not confer citizenship status at birth to a native-born Puerto Rican born after the Jones
Act in 1901 and before 1934).
See Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 845, 48 Stat. 1245 (extending United States citizenship to
Puerto Ricans born after April 11, 1899).
See HENRY WELLS, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL STUDY OF
CHANGING VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 85 (1969) (“Such increased authority as it did bestow, it counter-balanced in part with new controls.”).
Id.
See 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922) (“The act is entitled ‘An Act To provide a civil government
for Porto Rico, and for other purposes.’ It does not indicate by its title that it has a purpose to incorporate the Island into the Union. It does not contain any clause which declares such purpose or effect. While this is not conclusive, it strongly tends to show that
Congress did not have such an intention.”).
See id. at 304–13 (concluding that Congress did not, through the Jones Act, incorporate
Puerto Rico or set it on the path towards incorporation); THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at
51 (explaining the Court’s interpretation of the Jones Act in Balzac).
Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311.

450

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:2
180

were not defined by direct application of the Constitution.
The
only limit on this power was that Congressional territorial policy
should not violate “certain fundamental personal rights declared in
181
the Constitution.”
182
This case has been the subject of criticism, in large part because
it is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s previous holding in Rass183
mussen v. United States. There, the Court inferred intent to incorporate Alaska based on Congressional conferral of citizenship to Alas184
kan residents. Yet in Balzac, the Court came to the exact opposite
conclusion after Congress had conferred citizenship to the residents
of Puerto Rico—requiring that there be a “declaration of purpose” by
185
Congress in order to find intent to incorporate the territory. Nevertheless, this insistence that Congress explicitly declare its purpose
to incorporate Puerto Rico—and the fact that it has yet to do so after
a century of United States control of Puerto Rico—has controlled the
status of native-born Puerto Ricans ever since.
In 1950, Congress continued its legislation to promote increased
186
home rule for Puerto Rico by passing Public Law 600. This law allowed residents of Puerto Rico to adopt a local constitution, subject
to Congressional approval, for internal civil affairs, thus creating a
187
process for joint approval. Pursuant to Public Law 600, Puerto Rico
held a referendum on whether to organize a government centered
on commonwealth status as well as a constitutional convention, which
188
would then be subjected to Congressional approval.
Under this
proposed commonwealth, however, the legal and political relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States was to remain largely
189
unchanged from that which had existed since 1917. This is because

180
181
182

183
184

185
186
187
188
189

See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 52 (interpreting the implications of the Court’s decision in Balzac).
Id. (citing Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13).
See id. (“The conspicuous deficiencies in this controlling jurisprudence cannot be sustained upon serious scrutiny, yet the destiny of the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico has been
determined for eight decades based on the flawed logic and mind-bending cognitive dissonance of this misconceived ruling.”).
197 U.S. 516 (1905).
See id. at 522 (“This declaration . . . is the equivalent . . . of the formula employed from
the beginning to express the purpose to incorporate acquired territory into the United
States, especially in the absence of other provisions showing an intention to the contrary.”).
Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311.
Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319.
Id.
See id.
WELLS, supra note 175, at 233.
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Public Law 600 provided for a partial repeal of the Jones Act, with the
rest of the 1917 act to stay in effect under a new statute, the Puerto
190
Rican Federal Relations Act. The remaining provisions of the Jones
Act that were to be incorporated into the new statute pertained to
191
Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States. Thus, the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act, as the amended Jones Act would be
known, was to keep in effect the relationship between Puerto Rico
and the United States established by the Jones Act and interpreted by
the Court in Balzac.
Nevertheless, on June 4, 1951, 76.5% of Puerto Ricans approved
Public Law 600 and voted in favor of “permanent association” with
192
the United States in the form of commonwealth status.
After accepting Congressional amendments to the draft of the proposed con193
stitution of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican constitutional convention
amended its Constitution in accordance with the congressional mandate, and the constitution formally took effect on July 25, 1952, estab194
lishing commonwealth status for Puerto Rico. That same year, the
citizenship status of Puerto Ricans was bolstered by the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, which made every person born in Puerto
195
Rico a statutory citizen of the United States at birth.
Though some have suggested that establishing commonwealth
status in Puerto Rico ended Congress’s plenary power under the Ter196
ritory Clause, both the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch
197
have rejected this view. Thus, since the establishment of common190
191
192
193

194
195

196

197

See WELLS, supra note 175, at 232 (detailing the fourth and fifth sections of Public Law
600, which partially repealed the Jones Act).
Id.
Smith, supra note 28, at 269.
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 16 (stating that Congress approved the local constitution draft, subject to certain amendments, on July 3, 1952); Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at
18 & nn.13, 14 (noting Congress’s rejection of “positive rights” in the Puerto Rican constitution and the addition of an education proviso).
Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 19 (describing the final stages of adoption for the Puerto Rican Constitution and the beginning of commonwealth status for the island).
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2006)) (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941,
and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States at
birth.”).
See Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 19 (“Under this reasoning, Congress lost general power to
regulate the internal affairs of Puerto Rico or to amend the ‘compact’ without Puerto Rican consent—much as Congress has no power to legislate for the now-independent Philippines or territories that have become states.”).
See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) (per curiam) (citing Califano v. Torres,
435 U.S. 1 (1978)) (“Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the
Constitution, to ‘make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
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wealth status more than half a century ago—and arguably, since the
Jones Act of 1917—nothing has changed with regard to the status of
198
Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States, or the citizenship
status of native-born Puerto Ricans.
D. Presidential Ineligibility of Native-Born Puerto Ricans
In order to qualify as natural born citizens, native-born Puerto Ri199
cans would have to establish a right through the principle of jus soli.
Having examined the Congressional treatment of Puerto Rico and its
citizens through Congress’s territorial incorporation and naturalization powers, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that legislation, this Comment concludes that native-born Puerto Ricans do not,
200
by virtue of their birthplace, qualify as natural born citizens and are
therefore ineligible for the office of the presidency under Article II of
the Constitution.

198

199
200

tory . . . belonging to the United States,’ may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so
long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”); Political Status of Puerto Rico, 1991: Hearings on S. 244 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
193–94 (1991) (statement of Hon. Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General) (“We also
have concerns with some of the provisions that define the commonwealth option. For
example, Section 402(a) would declare that Puerto Rico ‘enjoys sovereignty, like a state,
to the extent provided by the Tenth Amendment,’ and that ‘[t]his relationship is permanent unless revoked by mutual consent.’ These declarations are totally inconsistent with
the Constitution.”).
Since the referendum of 1951 endorsing commonwealth status, three other referenda
have been held on the status of Puerto Rico. On July 23, 1967, a second referendum offered three options to Puerto Ricans: 60.5% voted for commonwealth status, 38.9% voted
for statehood, and 0.6% voted for independence. Smith, supra note 28, at 270. Two referenda were introduced in the 1990s. On November 14, 1993, 48.6% of Puerto Ricans
voted for commonwealth status, 46.3% voted for statehood, and 4.4% voted for independence. Id. Finally, on December 13, 1998, a fourth option was introduced—the “Associated Republic,” a status meaning something “less autonomous than independence
but more than commonwealth status.” Id. at 271. But because the ballot described commonwealth status as “the colonial option,” commonwealth proponents protested by encouraging voters to choose none of the options. Id. As a result, 50.3% of voters chose
“none of the above,” 46.5% chose statehood, 2.5% chose independence, and 0.1% chose
commonwealth status. Id. While none of these votes were binding on Congress, the last
two votes in the 1990s drew voter turnout of 73.5% and 71.3%, respectfully. Id. This
demonstrates the level of interest Puerto Ricans have in the question of their island’s political status.
See Part I.B., supra (discussing why the only claim to natural born status for native-born
Puerto Ricans is through the principle of jus soli).
If persons born in Puerto Rico have an alternative claim to natural born status—such as
right by jus sanguinis—then they may be eligible for the presidency, but birthplace alone
does not make these citizens eligible.
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First, persons born in Puerto Rico cannot claim natural born citizenship through the common law principle of jus soli because Puerto
Rico, as an unincorporated territory, was not made part of the United
201
States in the fullest sense.
Nothing in the congressional acts governing Puerto Rico—not even establishing commonwealth rule—has
so fundamentally changed its status as to negate the fact that it still
202
has not yet been fully incorporated by the United States. This unincorporated status of Puerto Rico is crucial to understanding that
the territory does not qualify as United States soil for purposes of determining natural born citizenship through jus soli because this status
signaled “an implied denial of the rights of the inhabitants to American citizenship until Congress by further action shall signify its assent
203
thereto.”
The Supreme Court has upheld the disparate treatment
of Puerto Ricans from citizens of the states, ruling that under the
Territory Clause Congress “may treat Puerto Rico differently from
204
States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”
What
makes this disparate treatment permissible is not simply that there is
a rational justification for the different treatment—there may be rational reasons to treat citizens of different states differently, but that
is impermissible. Rather, what makes the disparate treatment of
Puerto Rico and its residents permissible is residence in a territory—
205
“the status of place.”
It is for this same reason—a difference in
status of place—that residents of Puerto Rico do not have the right to
206
vote in presidential elections.
The courts have held that in the
Electoral College system, the right to vote for presidential electors
207
applies only to the states and the District of Columbia.
Since

201

202
203
204
205
206

207

See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (holding that the right to trial by
jury was not “fundamental”); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291, 294 (White, Shiras,
and McKenna, JJ., concurring) (1901) (holding that fundamental rights apply in unincorporated territories).
See Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 19.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 280.
Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980).
See Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 24 (arguing that Harris exposes the deeper issue of status
of place as determining the disparate treatment of Puerto Rico from states).
Nelson D. Hermilla, Puerto Rico 1898–1998: The Institutionalization of Second Class Citizenship?, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 275, 297 (1998); Ezequiel Lugo, The Unfinished Business of American Democracy, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 871, 872 (2007). Since 1980, however, Puerto Ricans
have participated in presidential primaries. See Hermilla, supra, at 284 n.29.
See Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that the
right to vote for presidential electors through the Electoral College was reserved for the
states and the District of Columbia, and that Puerto Rico is not a state within the meaning
of the U.S. Constitution).
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Puerto Rico is not a state under the Constitution, and has not been
granted electors via a constitutional amendment as in the case of the
209
District of Columbia, it is not entitled to presidential electors and
citizens of Puerto Rico therefore have no constitutional right to vote
210
in presidential elections.
Oddly enough, although United States
citizens retain their voting rights in presidential elections when they
211
move to foreign countries, they lose that same right to vote if they
212
move to Puerto Rico. Thus, Puerto Rico does not have what states
do—formal congressional representation, votes in the Electoral College, and, most importantly, the status that entails full rights for its
residents.
If birth in Puerto Rico, as a United States territory, granted a person natural born citizenship, it would not have taken a federal statute
to extend citizenship to residents of and persons born in Puerto Rico.
Furthermore, if Congress, through its powers under the Territorial
213
Clause, decided to revoke the extension of citizenship to Puerto Ricans, then surely persons thereafter born on the island would have no
jus soli claims—even though the territory still belonged to the United
States, because only natural born citizens are eligible for the presidency. This illustrates that, even with the extension of statutory citizenship, birthplace in Puerto Rico does not provide natural born citi-

208

209

210

211

212

213

See Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (mem.) (citing Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera
Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992)) (stating that Puerto Rico is not a state within the
meaning of the Constitution).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (“The District constituting the seat of Government of
the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of
electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no
event more than the least populous State . . . .”).
Igartúa, 417 F.3d at 147 (“As Puerto Rico has no electors, its citizens do not participate in
the presidential voting, although they may do so if they take up residence in one of the 50
states . . . .”).
See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973ff-1(3) (2006). See also Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States (Igartúa I), 32 F.3d 8, 10
(1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting UOCAVA to protect the voting rights of citizens who temporarily reside overseas), aff’d, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1035 (2006).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-2(b)(1), 1973ff-6(8). See also Igartúa I, 32 F.3d at 10 (asserting that
UOCAVA did not guarantee that a citizen moving to Puerto Rico will be eligible to vote
in a presidential election); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d. Cir. 2001) (holding
that UOCAVA did not violate the Equal Protection clause by providing presidential voting rights to former residents of a state currently residing outside the United States, but
not to former residents of a state currently residing in Puerto Rico).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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zenship—and presidential eligibility—through jus soli because of
Puerto Rico’s unincorporated status.
Second, the citizenship enjoyed by native-born Puerto Ricans,
which is statutorily protected, does not have the same meaning as or
consequence of natural-born citizenship, which is constitutionally
214
protected.
Natural-born citizens enjoy the full protection and
rights of the Constitution. Natural-born citizenship also entails a legal and political permanence—once a right to natural born citizenship is established under the Constitution, it cannot be stripped away.
The same permanence and scope of rights and benefits afforded
to natural born citizens are not shared by Puerto Rican citizens. In a
variety of circumstances, Congress continues to treat Puerto Rico and
its residents, native-born and otherwise, differently than it treats states
215
216
and their residents. Through its territorial powers, Congress can,
in its discretion, choose to apply or refrain from applying the Constitution, federal treaty, or federal statutes to Puerto Rico. Extending
citizenship to residents of Puerto Rico, however, did not also extend
the full protections and rights of the Constitution to those resi217
dents.
Federal courts will uphold the application of those laws
218
But because no Congress can restrict
while they remain in effect.
219
the power of any future Congress to amend or nullify a statute, any
such statute—including the extension of citizenship—cannot be
guaranteed as territorial policy in the future. “What Congress has
220
granted . . . it may always take away.” It follows that equating statutory citizenship with natural born citizenship could quite plausibly
lead to the Natural Born Citizen Clause having one meaning today
and quite another tomorrow, all at the whim of Congress. This would
violate the bright-line meaning the Framers intended the natural

214

215
216
217
218

219
220

THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 55 (noting, in light of constitutionally protected citizenship versus statutory citizenship, the differences between congressionally granted statutory rights and constitutional rights).
See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 21 & n.19 (describing several ways in which Congress
treats Puerto Rico differently from states for purposes of federal benefits).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (explaining that some of the grants of
power and limitations in the Constitution are not always and everywhere applicable).
THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 55 (“[F]ederal courts will uphold statutes creating local
government structures in the territories as long as the statutes creating those structures
remain in effect and unaltered by federal law.”).
Id. at 55, 60 n.44.
Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 17.
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born clause to have. Therefore, the temporary nature of the statutory citizenship that native-born Puerto Ricans enjoy lacks both the
scope and permanence of the legal and political rights of natural
222
born citizenship.
Thus, this Comment concludes that native-born Puerto Ricans
have no right to natural born status through jus soli for two related
reasons: neither the status of the unincorporated territory in which
they are born nor the legal or political status they are granted as
statutory citizens has the scope or permanence of Constitutional
rights and privileges associated with natural born citizenship.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the question of who qualifies for presidential eligibility under the natural born proviso of Article II, Section 1, clause 5 presents
a fascinating issue on a theoretical level, the case of native-born
Puerto Ricans illustrates that the issue has a real-life impact as well.
There appear to be two ways to make these persons eligible for the
office of the presidency. First, Congress could pass a constitutional
amendment that clarifies the definition of “natural born citizen” to
223
include persons born in Puerto Rico. Second, Congress could fully
incorporate Puerto Rico into the Union, designating the territory as
destined for statehood and its citizens natural born by virtue of being
born within the United States in the fullest sense. This Comment
now considers the implications of presidential ineligibility for citizens
of Puerto Rico and other United States territories.
Without question, “eligibility for [the] office alone promotes de224
mocratic values separate and apart from actual service in office.” It
is therefore understandable that preclusion from the office of the
presidency for certain persons who at their birth are citizens of this
country leads to discontent and sentiments of second-class citizen225
ship. But those sentiments are likely to exist regardless of whether
221

222
223
224
225

See Pryor, supra note 32, at 895 (suggesting that the Framers intended for “natural born”
to be a bright-line rule, much like the age and residency requirements of presidential eligibility).
THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 55.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to suggest what would be the best wording for
such a proposed constitutional amendment.
Ho, supra note 23, at 576.
See, e.g., Cabranes, supra note 160, at 492 (concluding that Congress extended second
class citizenship to Puerto Ricans and created an anomalous situation that has lasted ever
since); Guzman, supra note 171, at 182 (claiming that the current policy towards Puerto
Rico and its residents “creates second class citizens”); Hermilla, supra note 206, at 278
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or not native-born Puerto Ricans are deemed eligible to run for the
presidency by virtue of the many other ways in which citizenship in
Puerto Rico has a different legal and political meaning than citizen226
ship in any one of the fifty states in the Union.
Thus, to the extent that the current political and legal status of
227
the island is the root of the problem, and to the extent that citizens
228
of Puerto Rico are dissatisfied with that status, making native-born
citizens of Puerto Rico eligible to run for the presidency will not fix
the problem. In fact, it will likely exacerbate it. With each small political gain citizens of the island receive, the less dissatisfied with the
current status of the island and the less motivated they will be to mobilize and vote for change at the polls—whether that change be
statehood or independence. Therefore, if one views Puerto Rico’s
status as an unincorporated territory with commonwealth status as an
obstacle to full citizenship, extending eligibility to the office of the
presidency distracts from rather than solves the underlying problem.
To the extent that citizens of Puerto Rico do not want a change in the
current status of their island, however, they must accept the fact that
under this framework the office of the presidency is out of their
reach.

226
227

228

(“No matter what position the individual ultimately takes in his or her conclusion of what
Puerto Rico is or should be, the longstanding and current legacy of Puerto Rico’s connection to the United States is clearly that island inhabitants are second class citizens that do
not have a voting representative in the United States and cannot vote for the President.”);
Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 30
(2001) (arguing that the Balzac decision created second class citizenship for Puerto Ricans); Ediberto Román, Empire Forgotten: The United States’s Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42
VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (1997) (arguing that, through the Jones Act, Congress extended
second class citizenship to Puerto Ricans).
See discussion supra Part III.D.
For a comprehensive listing of those in favor and those opposed to commonwealth status,
see José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism As Constitutional Doctrine, 100 HARV. L. REV.
450, 460–61 n.55 (1986) (reviewing JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND
PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985)).
Consider the results of the last two referenda on the status of Puerto Rico. In 1993, a
combined 50.7% (46.3% for statehood and 4.4% for independence) voted for change; in
1994, a combined 49% (46.5% for statehood and 2.5% for independence) voted for
change, although this referendum was protested by a large segment of the electorate. See
supra note 198.

